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ONE PHASE OF
THE NEW DEBATE ON
THE INIQUITOUS LAW-
Hart and Fuller on Radbruch
WILLIAM F. CAHILL, B.A., LL.B., J.C.D.*
ERICA, IN THE FIRST HALF of the twentieth century, heard little
debate on the question, "Need the law be moral?" Many who might
have taken the negative in such a debate said nothing because they
thought the question meaningless or at least unprofitable.' Not imagin-
ing that the law could need conscience, they discounted the power of
conscience to make demands upon the law, and so put aside the
problem of relating morals and the law. It was enough to know that in
the distant past Blackstone had maintained that an immoral law had no
validity,2 while Austin asserted that a law which actually exists is a
law though it contravene morals. 3
The debate could be revived only by the occurrence of some event
in which might appear the unimagined horrors that could be produced
by laws which neither relied upon conscience nor answered to con-
science. Such an event began to unfold in the thirties, but it fully evolved
in the forties, and it has since had the effect of reviving debate upon the
most uneasy question of jurisprudence.
* Priest of the Diocese of Albany. Professor of Law, St. John's University School of
Lav.
1 See Pound, Natural Natural Law and Positive Natural Law, 68 L. Q. REV. 330,
335 (1952).
2 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41.
3 AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 185 (1954).
The Event that Provoked Debate
The event made its crucial impact after
the war, when the German courts faced
the task of restoring respect for law and
justice after the collapse of a regime that
had respected nei-
ther. One phase of












acts had served the purposes of statutes en-
acted by the regime and repealed after its
collapse.
The first "denazified" German courts had
to resolve this problem under decrees of the
occupation government.4 The decrees de-
clared that some of the acts described were
now punishable as crimes against human-
ity. The judge sitting in such a case could
find that the occupation decrees were ex-
isting law, to be applied regardless of any
moral issues which might seem to be in-
volved. A few judges did boggle at apply-
ing the decrees as ex post facto criminal
laws. Most of them, however, fulfilled the
expectations of observers who said that
"the German judge worships the written
law and slavishly follows its letter. ' '
Later, when the decrees were withdrawn,
4 Loewenstein, Reconstruction of the Administra-
tion of Justice in American-Occupied Germany, 61
HARv. L. REV. 419 (1948).
5 Id. at 432.
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the German judges startled the legal world.
They disallowed the defenses, by declaring
void the Nazi statutes relied upon. The
phenomenon is most consistently evident in
a series of "informer" cases. The most fam-
ous of these, rather late in the series, was
tried in 1949.6
In 1944, a German soldier, in transit be-
tween assignments, visited briefly with his
wife. He said to her that he disapproved
of Hitler and other leading Nazis, and that
he regretted the failure of the then most
recent attempt to assassinate the Leader.
The conversation was private; the wife was
not in military service or engaged in war
production. She reported the remarks and
the soldier was condemned to death. Be-
cause of the military crisis, his sentence was
commuted and he was sent to the front. He
survived the war and charged his wife with
having unlawfully deprived him of free-
dom - a crime under the German Criminal
Code of 1871.
At the woman's trial, it appeared that
she had informed against her husband
because she was interested in other men.
Her defense was that her act was lawful, as
the denunciation of a criminal.
A statute enacted in 1934 made im-
prisonment the penalty for public state-
ments disparaging the Party or its leaders
and calculated to undermine the people's
confidence in their political leadership. A
1938 statute provided the death penalty
for persons guilty of impairing or destroying
the national power of resistance. This law
specified the offenses of publicly soliciting
or inviting refusal to fulfill obligations of
military service and of publicly seeking to
injure the will of the German people to
resist their enemies. It was part of a com-
6 64 HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1951).
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prehensive enactment punishing such acts
as harboring deserters and evading military
obligations by self-inflicted injuries. Upon
the basis of his conversation with his wife,
the soldier was convicted under one or both
of these statutes. Both statutes were re-
pealed at the end of the war.7
The postwar court fouhd the wife guilty
under the Code of 1871. Her defensive re-
liance upon the Nazi statutes postulated, of
course, that the statutes were valid and that
her husband's conversation with her was an
act criminal within the intent of the statutes.
A finding that the Nazi court had con-
demned her husband contrary to the intend-
ment of the statutes would not exculpate
the wife. In convicting her, the court found
the statutes, at least in so far as they pur-
ported to warrant her husband's conviction
and to justify her denunciation of him, were
void because they were "contrary to the
sound conscience and sense of justice of all
decent human beings."'8 In similar deci-
sions, the Nazi statutes upon which the de-
fendants relied were found invalid because
contrary to a "higher law."9 From the em-
bers of the Nazi statutes' funeral pyre, the
flame of debate was rekindled by Gustav
Radbruch.10
A Positivist Converted
Before the war, Radbruch's legal posi-
tivism had been unexceptionably ortho-
dox." He had preserved the insistence of
7 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply
to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 653, 654
(1958).
S Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 619 (1958).
9 Fuller, supra note 7, at 659.
10 Hart, supra note 8, at 616.
1 THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH
AND DABIN 52, 53, 55, 57 (Wilk transl. 1950).
Austin 12 and Kelsen 13 upon the proposition
that men have a moral duty to make good
laws and to administer the law morally.
Austin had acknowledged that every devel-
oped legal system contains certain neces-
sary elements "bottomed in the common
nature of man.' 4 Kelsen,15 and Radbruch
after him, saw a place for moral factors
in the acceptance of the state, the personifi-
cation of the law. Again following in the
steps of Austin' 6 and Kelsen,' 7 the prewar
Radbruch had declared that there is no
necessary moral element in the law itself:
"the view of values and the view of exist-
ence lie side by side, like distinct closed
circles"' and "statements concerning the
Ought may be established or proved only
by other statements concerning the
Ought."' 9
Austin 20 himself, and his American dis-
ciple Gray,21 had rejoiced in the prompt
and thorough acceptance accorded by the
German jurists to the gret "truth" of legal
positivism: "the Law of a State ... is not an
ideal, but something which actually exists.
" . .- 22 As recently as 1951, an American
student of the German courts operating
12 AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DE-
TERMINED 231 (1954).
13 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Part 1, 50
L. Q. REV. 474, 481 (1934).
14 AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 373. See id.
at 367-69.
15 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Part H, 51
L. Q. REV. 517, 535 (1935).
16 AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 12.
17 Kelsen, supra note 15, at 517.
18 THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH
AND DABIN 52, 53 (Wilk transl. 1950).
19 Id. at 55.
20 AUSTIN, op. Cit. supra note 12, at 187.
21 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
96 (1921).
22 Id. at 94.
under the occupation directives thought
the German judge was ". . . unaffected by
intellectual doubts as to the intrinsic justice
of the legal rule he has to apply, provided
it is enacted by the authority of the state,
and he does not question whether the au-
thority is legitimate or not."'23
Radbruch, 24 in 1946, declared his renun-
ciation of the central positivist doctrine on
the relation of law and morals, that the law
as law has no necessary moral content.
He had become convinced that the thorough
commitment of the German lawyers to that-
doctrine and its slogan "law as law" had
helped the Nazis to obtain power and to
use it through their lawless statutes.
It should be remarked that some of the*
Nazi statutes were lawless to a degree far
beyond the iniquity of the statutes relied
upon by the soldier's wife. The regime had
enacted a number of statutes which pur-
ported to make lawful, ex post facto, kill-
ings which had occurred in Party purges
and in the concentration camps. The kill-
ings were crimes under the laws in effect
when they occurred, but the "curative"
statutes, which were often secret, declared
them lawful. 25
23 Loewenstein, Reconstruction of the Administra-
tion of Justice in American-Occupied Germany, 61
HARV. L. REV. 419, 432 (1948).
24 Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und Uber-
gesetzliches Recht, 1 SUEDDEUTSCHE JURISTEN-
ZEITUNG 105 (1946), reprinted in RADBRUCH,
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 347 (1950). Some students
of Radbruch feel that his humanism had led him
much earlier to a recognition of the existence of
"supra-positive" norms. See Wolf, Revolution or
Evolution in Gustav Radbruch's Legal Philosophy,
3 NATURAL L. F. 1, 5 (1958).
25 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630,
651-52 (1958), citing Radbruch, Die Erneuerung
des Rechts, 2 DIE WANDLUNG 8 (1947) and GIESE,
Verkindung und Gesetzeskraft, 76 ARCHIV DES
OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 464 (1951).
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Convinced that these evil laws had
gained and held their sway by grace of the
positivistic dogma on the law's immunity to
moral requirements, Radbruch announced
his new doctrine of the law above the
statute. The Recht, as he called it, is a
legalizing norm,, which gives or denies le-
gality to the statute. The Recht is not Kel-
sen's higher norm which determines merely
the necessary form of enactment, without
reference to the content thereof. The Recht
contains, among its necessary elements,
the fundamental principles of humanitarian
morality. These moral elements of the Recht
test the formally enacted statute; the statute
has legality or legal validity only if it meets
this test.26
A Positivist Concerned but
Not Converted
H. L. A. Hart, the Oxford professor of
jurisprudence who has for several years
been visiting at Harvard, finds na'vet both
in Radbruch's indictment of positivism as
an aid to Nazi power and in Radbruch's
doctrine of the legalizing Recht.27 Profes-
sor Hart thinks that there was no connec-
tion between the positivisitic separation of
law from morals and the Germans' accept-
ance of a regime of statutory lawlessness. 2
He considers that Radbruch's new doctrine
sacrifices the integrity of morals 29 and brings
back into the law a bit of "stark nonsense"
which Austin had happily eliminated. 30
To Professor Hart, the problem of the
unjust law is not a legal problem. It poses,
he thinks, a purely moral dilemma; the citi-
zen who faces the dilemma is simultaneously
26 Radbruch; supra note 24.
27 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 617-18 (1958).
28 Ibid.
29 Id. at 620.
30 Id. at 616.
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subject to two contradictory moral duties -
to resist the law and to obey the law. He
is obliged to obey the law by the moral ideal
of fidelity to law, which requires obedience
to any law, simply because it is law. 31 On
the other hand, he is morally bound to re-
sist the law if obedience to it involves an act
which is contrary to other moral ideals. 32
Therefore, the positivistic assertion that the
iniquitous law is still law does not solve,
or purport to solve, the question, "Should
the citizen submit or resist?" That can be
answered only by a moral choice between
the dilemmatic moral obligations.
It seems that Professor Hart has added a
complicating factor to the problem of choice
which Austin described. Austin said that
the citizen who disobeyed a law which was
contrary to the law of God would be
"hanged up," and his hanging would prove
that the unjust law was valid. 34 The validity
which Austin claimed for the law was, as
Holmes perceived, 35 a simple physical valid-
ity. The law is an accurate prediction that
its violators will hang. But that is not
enough for Hart - he postulates an obliga-
tory character in the legal norm, as Kelsen
did,3  but, unlike Kelsen, 37 identifies or at
least reinforces the legal obligatoriness of
the law by the moral ideal of fidelity to law.
This ideal imposes a moral duty to obey
the law which exists, whatever the content
of that law.3 8
31 Id. at 597, 622.
32 Id. at 620.
33 Id. at 618, 620.
34 AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 185.
35 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 461 (1897).
36 Kelsen, The Pare Theory of Law, Part 1, 50 L.
Q. REV. 474, 489-90 (1934).
37 Id. at 485.
38 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 618-20 (1958).
It is here, of course, that Professor Hart
involves himself in what his colleague Lon
Fuller describes as Alice-in-Wonderland
nonsense.39 His moral dilemma postulates
a moral duty to do what is (in the case sup-
posed) immoral, and it purports to offer a
morally face choice between two immorali-
ties.
That kind of nonsense is not imposed by
any ethical system, not even by Benthamite
utilitarianism from which Professor Hart
takes his formula for the ideal of fidelity to
law, "to obey punctually; to censure
freely." °40 In Bentham's book, resistance to
law was moral when resistance contributed
more to the common utility than obedience
did.4 1 In the converse situation, resistance
was immoral. Professor Hart would have it
that both obedience and resistance are, in
the same situation, both moral and im-
moral.
Bentham limited his thesis on the moral-
ity of resisting the law not by principle,
but by what he took to be an observed fact.
Not having seen or imagined the Nazi
regime, Bentham said there is no common
sign, except an explicit convention, by which
the greater utility of resistance might be
known.42 Yet Bentham insisted upon the
morality of resistance in principle.
The discontented party would then take this
resolution to resist or to submit, upon just
grounds . . . according to what should ap-
39 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630,
656 (1958).
40 Hart, supra note 38, at 597, citing BENTHAM,
A Fragment on Government (preface, 16th para.),
in 1 WORKS 230 (Bowring ed. 1843).
41 BENTHAM, A Fragment on Government (ch.
IV, para. 21), in 1 WORKS 287 (Bowring ed.
1843).
42 Id. at 287, 288 (ch. IV, paras, 22 and 26),
pear to them the importance of the ... dis-
pute... [and] the probability ... of success
- according, in short, as the mischiefs of
submission should appear to bear a less, or a
greater ratio to the mischiefs of resistance. 43
Austin does not tell us how he would
apply the Benthamite doctrine to the case
of the citizen hanged up to demonstrate the
validity of the law. But neither does Austin
suggest that the law's validity creates a
moral duty to obey it or that the citizen's
choice is a moral dilemma in which the
alternatives of resistance and submission
are both morally evil and, at the same time,
morally good.
The rationale of Kelsen's insistence upon
the amorality of law seems quite clear. For
him, morality exists as a fact of subjective
human experience and that experience mo-
tivates some of man's external acts,44 even
those "natural acts" by which a legal sys-
tem is established and those by which men
make laws and apply them. 45 Yet, because
morality is utterly irrational, it cannot com-
municate itself to the content of the general
or specific norms of law which are evolved
rationally from the basic formal norm. 46
Holmes' rationale is not so clear - one
does not know whether he insists absolutely
upon the amorality of law, 47 as Kelsen
does, or whether his postulate of the law's
lack of moral content is only tentative. Cer-
tainly he had no confidence in the morality
relied upon by the traditional common-law
judges.4 8 Yet Holmes cherished a faith in
43 Id. at 291 (ch. IV, para. 39).
44 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Part 1, 50
L. Q. REV. 474, 481 (1934).
45 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Part 11, 51
L. Q. REV. 517, 534-35 (1935).
46 Kelsen, supra note 44, at 484.
47 Hart, Holmes' Positivism- An Addendum, 64
HARV. L. REV. 929, 930, 932 (1951).
48 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 460 (1897).
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the man of the future - the master of sta-
tistics and economics.4 9 It is possible that
this faith founded a hope that Holmes'
messiah should someday validate a morality
which would rationally modify the bad-man
view of law.
Professor Hart is not content to leave
the positivistic doctrine where Austin,
Holmes and Kelsen left it. He is so moved
by the Nazi statutes and by their effect upon
Radbruch and the German judges that he
attempts to link the amoral law and the
moral ideal of fidelity to law. Professor
Fuller finds Hart's attempt impossible be-
cause there is, in the system of legal posi-
tivism, no mediating principle between law
and morality 0 - neither can generate or be
generated by the other.
Law and Morality: Mediated
or Differentiated
For Radbruch, the mediating principle
is the fundamental of humanitarian moral-
ity. Professor Fuller proposes human pur-
pose as the mediating principle which tests
the morality of all human conduct and
which tests the law itself as a product of
human conduct.' "What law is cannot be
separated from what it is for, and what it
is for can not be separated from what it
ought to be"5 2 seems a fair, if concise, state-
ment of Fuller's view. He. asserts that law
49 Id. at 470.
50 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630,
656 (1958). Compare Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.-L. REV.
593, 624-26 (1958).
51 Fuller, supra note 50 at 644, 645, 661, 665-69,
670.
52 Witherspoon, The Relation of Philosophy to
Jurisprudence, 3 NATURAL, L. F. 5, 108 (1958).
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is tested by "those principles of social order
which will enable men to attain a satisfac-
tory life in common." He conceives that the
one central aim common to all the schools of
natural law is the discovery of those princi-
ples. All theories of natural law, he says,
accept the possibility of "discovery" of the
purposes for which men act in social con-
cert.
53
To explain the relation of law and morals
in terms of a "mediating principle," as Pro-
fessor Fuller does, seems to me an undue
concession to the positivistic position. The
explanation seems to accept as its point of
departure the positivistic view that the legal
order and moral order have not the same
foundation, thus the "mediating principle"
appears to be less than fundamental.
The Thomistic philosophy of law and
morals postulates a common foundation
of both orders. The orders are then dif-
ferentiated - rather than mediated - by
principles derived from the concept of
rational coercibility.
Both law and morals are orders of con-
duct - the conduct to be ordered is con-
duct which can be performed consciously
and voluntarily, so the order to be imposed
upon such conduct and the norms of order
must be rational. Though non-rational con-
comitants can aid the effectiveness of con-
duct consciously determined, no norm can
have basic effectiveness in ordering such
conduct unless the norm rationally erects
rational purposes to guide human choice.
Professor Fuller's phrase "purposes for
vhich men act" seems to limit the area of
reality in which reason can discover pur-
poses for human conduct, to be imposed by
legal norms. The area he contemplates
53 Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3
NATURAL L. F. 83, 84 (1958).
seems to be that which includes the pur-
poses to which the men of a given commun-
ity have given positive, de facto recognition.
This looks to me like an exchange of legal
positivism for moral positivism.
For a Thomistic Aristotelian, 54 the area
into which reason pushes its search for
purposes to be imposed by law has a dimen-
sion beyond that which Professor Fuller
describes. Reason can and does discover
such purposes by recognizing that some
purposes are proposed to man by the con-
stitution of his nature. Reason perceives
that unless a man adopts these purposes,
he cannot be fully a man. The ultimate
reach of reason's voyage of discovery into
nature achieves the recognition of God as
nature's intelligent Creator. Here reason
grasps the conclusion that the purposes
which nature, through reason, tells man to
make his own in order to be a perfect man
are the purposes of God. Thus it appears
that by embracing these purposes man
achieves and perfects his personal relation
with God, reciprocating God's love for him
expressed in the acts by which God creates
and conserves him.
The moral order regulates human con-
duct by holding up to man purposes to be
rationally understood and voluntarily em-
braced. The moral norm touches im-
mediately the internal elements of human
conduct, understanding and voluntary de-
termination, which are beyond the reach
of direct coercion, and whose essential
character is destroyed if coercion reaches
them indirectly. An act which is done with-
out understanding that it is moral, or which
is done with that understanding but in-
voluntarily, is not a morally virtuous act.
On the other hand, much human conduct
54 See text infra at notes 71-76.
has an external element, which is within
the reach of coercive force. Holmes cor-
rectly perceived that there is no positive law
which does not threaten force to coerce
this external element of human conduct,
but he did not adequately distinguish be-
tween society's rational use of force or the
threat of force which makes law, and so-
ciety's irrational use of force which is
simple violence. Human conduct is ration-
ally and therefore justly coercible only
when (1) the conduct's external element is
separable from its internal element, and
(2) the external element, so separated,
serves an objectively just need of other
men. An enactment in legal form which
coerces or attempts to coerce conduct that
does not meet this dual test is not law but
violence.55
Differentiation Implies Limitation
Though Professor Fuller rejects the posi-
tivistic doctrine as inherently incapable of
reconciling law and morals, he is in sym-
pathy with what he conceives to be the real
reason for the positivists' fear of the natural
law schools' interpretation of law.5 6 He
feels that, though the positivists' fear is
"morbid," its object is quite real. He shares
their apprehension that an excess in the
purposive interpretation of law may issue
in affronts to human freedom and dignity.57
Fuller thinks it is this excess, and not the
commonly alleged and never realized an-
archy, which the positivists fear may result
from an acceptance and application of the
purposive view of natural law. He agrees
55 See GRANERIS, I PHILOSOPHIA IURIS, DE
NOTIONE IURIS 100-12, 122 (1943).
56 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630,
660,669 (1958).
57 Id. at 671.
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that there is reason to fear that if the pur-
posive interpretation of law is carried to
excess it may issue in one of the worst vices
of totalitarianism, requiring by force of law
conduct which is meaningless or grotesque
when it is not spontaneous.58
This anomaly, a purposive law requiring
external conduct which is meaningless when
it lacks the internal disposition that it pur-
ports to express, is impossible when the
legal order meets the Thomistic test of
coercibility. We can illustrate with an in-
stance Professor Fuller suggests, the act
of hanging out flags. The janitor of the
city hall might be properly coerced by law
to put out the flag at city hall on the oc-
casion of the visit of a personage who
stands for political and moral ideas ab-
horrent to the janitor - the flag at city
hall does not speak for the janitor and the
reception may have no reference to the
ideas of the personage. But a law coercing
the janitor to put out a flag at his own home
on the same occasion might well be, upon
the Thomistic principle, a law without legal
character. It certainly would be if: either
the janitor's act of hanging out a flag at his
home could in the circumstances signify
nothing but approval of principles immoral
because contrary to the law of God ex-
pressed in human nature, or that act con-
tributed nothing to the social welfare which
was not a derivative of the janitor's profes-
sion of approval of principles he did not,
in his own mind, approve.
A Moral Application of an Immoral Law
Professor Fuller, in his reply to Profes-
sor Hart, is careful to dissociate his view
of natural law from what he conceives to
58 Ibid.
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be the Roman Catholic position.5 He feels
that Catholics' acceptance of the Pope's
power to make an authoritative pronounce-
ment on natural law identifies natural law
with "a law that is above human laws" 60
and reduces the Catholic position on the
subject matter of such pronouncement to
another form of positivism. 6' Such pro-
nouncements, in Professor Fuller's opinion,
make it impossible for Catholics to discuss
the relation of enacted law to "generally
shared views of right conduct that have
grown spontaneously through experience
and discussion. 62
He instances the pronouncement of Pope
Pius XII on the duties of Catholic judges
in divorce actions. 63 The Pope, addressing
the national convention of Catholic Italian
lawyers in 1949, made two points. 64 Catho-
lics serving as judges in jurisdictions where
the existing law sanctions divorce should
not, "except for reasons of serious import,"
grant decrees touching marriages "valid be-
fore God and the Church." Catholic judges
should not, when granting divorce decrees,
induce practically "the erroneous view that
the existing bond of a valid marriage is
broken and that a subsequent union is valid
and binding." The Pope said no more, but
from the background of the question in the
59 Id. at 638, 660.




64 Allocution to the members of the Catholic
Lawyers' Union of Italy meeting in Rome for their
National Convention, delivered 6 Nov. 1949, 41
ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 597, 603 (1949). The
official text is Italian; I am responsible for the
translation. The two sentences of the text which
refer to divorce decrees represent one illustration
of the general proposition that not every appli-
cation of an unjust law involves the judge's ap-
proval of the law.
Roman decrees and in the writings of moral-
ists and canonists, it is clearly supposed
that the sense of the community supports
the divorce law. And it is equally clear
that the most cogent of the reasons which
warrant Catholic judges to issue a decree
are reasons which relate to their duty to
perform their office in the manner pre-
scribed by the law which creates that office,
and to their duty to preserve peace and
order within the community. Neither Pope
Pius XII nor any of the authorities65 who
have made decision or doctrine on these
matters suggest that a judge, in applying
such a law, morally should or might alter
the sense given it by constitutional process.
If the judge would not be morally war-
ranted in granting the decree according to
the requirements of the existing law, and
upon the facts proved, his moral duty
is to disqualify himself from sitting in the
case or, if necessary, to resign his office. 66
It is beyond question that Professor Ful-
ler does not reject either the right of any
judge to profess publicly his moral convic-
65 See, e.g., the decree of the Holy Office, 27 May
1886, addressed to questions proposed by certain
Bishops in France with reference to the propriety
of the conduct of a Catholic judge who, it was
postulated, in no way manifested externally his
moral convictions. The questions were answered
in the negative. DENZINGER-BANNWART, ENCHIRI-
DION SYMBOLORUM, No. 1865 (1928), citing 22
ACTA SANCTAE SEDIs 635 (1889-90).
For a summary treatment of the problem see
PRUMMER, MORAL THEOLOGY, No. 129, 130, 286
(Nolan ed. 1957).
I have seen an excellent detailed study of the his-
tory of this problem by Rev. Louis J. Hiegel, S.J.,
J.C.D., of Loyola University, New Orleans; I be-
lieve Father Hiegel's study has not yet been pub-
lished.
66 This conclusion is clearly indicated when one
refers the doctrine of the theologians on divorce
to their doctrine on the basic duties of the judge.
See, e.g., II NOLDIN, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MIOR-
ALIS, No. 727 (1951); III id. No. 669.
tions, or the related rights to abstain from
exercising his office when the law gives him
that option, or to eschew the office, so as to
remove himself from the moral dilemma
which offers the alternatives of a breach of
trust and a breach of some other conscien-
tious duty. Why, then, does the Pope's
pronouncement disturb him? Perhaps be-
cause the newspaper report 67 upon which
alone he relies did not make the Pope's
position clear. Yet, because Professor Ful-
ler takes this pronouncement as only one
instance illustrating a view of natural law
which he rejects, more general and funda-
mental reasons for his dissatisfaction must
be found.
A Pauline Paradox
In one paragraph, Professor Fuller men-
tions the Catholic acceptance of Church
pronouncements on natural law and the
Catholic Church's fostering of the "ration-
alistic tradition in ethics."' ," He has stated
here, apparently without realizing it, the
elements of a paradox which is as old as
Christianity. St. Paul, in the first chapter
of Romans,"9 announces that God has
shown Himself and His law to the Gen-
tiles by manifesting His attributes in crea-
tion, so that the principles of His law can
be perceived by men who reason upon "the
things that are made." Paul declares not
only that certain conduct is contrary to
God's law, but that such conduct's opposi-
tion to God's law is manifest to one who
attends to the indications of nature. The
elements of the Pauline paradox are these:
67 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630,
638 (1958), citing N. Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1949,
p. 1, col. 4 (late city ed.).
68 Fuller, supra note 67, at 660.
69 Romans 1: 18-32.
5 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1959
the moral law is so manifest in nature that
its precepts can be discovered there, with-
out revelation; God has now revealed that
the moral law is manifest in nature not only
in a general way but in respect of certain
of its specific precepts.
The Christian Church has always claimed
to teach without error what God has re-
vealed through Christ and His Apostles.7 0
The Church thus teaches (1) the existence
of natural law, (2) the ability of human
reason to discover the precepts of that law
and to apply them, (3) the content of
some of those precepts and their correct
application in some circumstances. 7
The Catholic doctrine of natural law
does not present to the civil society or to
the student of legal science a " 'natural
law' capable of concrete application like a
written code" - a phenomenon which Pro-
fessor Fuller rejects. The Catholic doctrine
validates the power of civil society to make,
70 St. Athanasius said of the first Ecumenical
Council, "The word of the Lord, pronounced by
the ecumenical synod of Nicea, remains forever."
Letter to the Africans, n. 2.
71 The Vatican Council, in the chapter on Revela-
tion, cites St. Paul, Rom. 1:20, and declares that
revelation is not absolutely necessary for man to
know his natural purpose as God's creature, for
by reason man can know that purpose and how
he should attain it. DENZINGER-BANNWART, EN-
CHIRIDON SYMBOLORUM, Nos. 1785, 1786.
The Second Lateran Council in 1139 con-
demned the neo-Manichean heresy which alleged
that the marital union is contrary to God's law.
Id. No. 367. That the Church taught the lawful-
ness of natural marriage appears more explicitly
in the condemnation of Manichean doctrine in
563: "If anyone condemns human marriage and
declares the begetting of children a horrible thing
... let him be anathema." Id. No. 241. The Coun-
cil of Trent in 1563 attributed to natural marriage
as well as to sacramental marriage the qualities
of perpetuity and indissolubility. Id. No 969. The
decree of the Holy Office cited above in note 61
is one example of how the Church indicates spe-
cific application of the doctrine that marriage is
indissoluble by the law of nature.
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and the competence of the jurisprudent to
recommend, reasonable accommodation of
the broad principles of human conduct to
the concrete contingencies in which a so-
ciety may find itself.72
Aristotle and Antigone
Professor Fuller relies upon Aristotle for
justification of his renunciation of "the no-
tion that there is a 'higher law' transcend-
ing the concerns of this life against which
human enactments must be measured and
declared invalid in case of conflict." 73
Of course, Aristotle never contemplated
even the possibility of a general or public
divine revelation such as that declared by
St. Paul. True too, it was in the Rhetoric,
and not in the Ethics, that Aristotle cited
the lines that Sophocles gave Antigone. 74
72 See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, q. 91,
art. 3, ad 1; q. 94, art. 4; q. 95, art. 2; q. 104,
art. 3, ad 1.
73 Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3
NATUtAL L. F. 83, 84, (1958).
74 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC BK. I. 13 (1373b, 1. 12);
Bk. I. 15 (1375b) (Cooper transl. 1932).
"The unwritten and unswerving laws of Heaven.
Not of to-day and yesterday they are,
But everlasting: none can date their birth.
Was I to fear the wrath of any man,
And brave Gods' vengeance for defying these?"
SOPHOCLES ANTIGONE 453-59, in 1 WAY, SOPHO-
CLES IN ENGLISH VERSE 195 (1909).
Yet Aristotle did not foreclose inquiry
into the divine fundament and finality of
morals. Indeed some of the teleological
doctrines announced in Aristotle's Meta-
physics7 5 are pregnant with a much larger
view of man's natural responsibility to God
than is suggested in the Ethics' few allu-
sions to the divine elements of human
virtue.7 Can one say that this view is
closed forever to Aristotle's followers be-
cause the Philosopher himself applied to
morals only a limited measure of his tele-
ology?
The purposes of this paper are to state
the elements of the revived debate on the
legal character of unmoral laws, and to
relate those elements to their historical
context. A full restatement of the Thom-
istic position on the general question, an
adequate analysis of the duties of Catholic
officials applying divorce laws, and a more
thorough consideration of the difficulties
Professor Fuller raises, are tasks the ac-
complishment of which will require much
labor from many writers.
75 ARISTOTLE, MERAPHYSICS Bk. a 2 (994a and b,
especially 994b, 1. 5-10), Bk. K. 7 (1064a and b,
1065a and 1065b, 1. 1-5) (Ross transl. 1928).
76 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
Bk. X. 8 (1178b, 1. 7-25; 1179a, 1. 23-33) (Ross
transl. 1925).
